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# AIR WAR COLLEGE



## RESEARCH REPORT

INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND THIRD WORLD CONFLICT


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COLONEL LARRY W. TIEMAN

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UNITED STATES AIR FORCE  
MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA

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INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND THIRD WORLD CONFLICT

by

Larry W. Tleman  
Colonel, USAF

AN AIR POWER SYMPOSIUM TOPIC SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY

IN

FULFILLMENT OF THE DEFENSE ANALYTICAL STUDY

CURRICULUM REQUIREMENT

Advisor: Dr. James E. Winkates

MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA

March, 1990

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Terrorist incidents during the 1980s drove the Reagan Administration to adopt a series of policy initiatives to combat the threat. The US combatting terrorism policy as stated in the "Vice President's Task Force Report on Combatting Terrorism" has enjoyed some success in dealing with the international terrorist threat. Terrorist activities no longer dominate today's headlines. However, logic would dictate that the U.S. is enjoying a temporary lull in overt terrorist acts directed against our interests and that the terrorism genie is not dead but merely resting.

Demise of superpower influence during 1990s will most likely lead to increased regional instabilities and smaller but more intense disagreements--an atmosphere ripe for the use of terrorism. State sponsored terrorism, classical terrorist groups, and terrorism used as a tactic by insurgents and the drug cartel will flourish in this environment.

The USG has developed an infrastructure based on the lead agency concept to deal with the international terrorist threat. This endeavor led by the Department of State uses an array of foreign policy tools in the multilateral, bilateral and unilateral areas. The interagency approach has proven to be effective in coordinating USG activities--the US military and the USAF are integral players in this effort. Despite our success, potential enhancements within the interagency arena, JCS and the USAF could be adopted to increase our effectiveness. These endeavors are especially critical in the fiscally constrained environment of the 1990s.

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## INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND THIRD WORLD CONFLICT

"Terrorism is not just criminal activity,  
but an unbridled form of warfare"  
George P. Schultz, 1985

### INTRODUCTION

Until the 1980s, the bureaucracy and the nation as a whole had not really focused on terrorisms' direct impact on our national well-being. While we remember the tragic events in Munich during the 1972 Olympics, the reality of terrorist activities and their direct effect on the U.S. public had not struck home. Starting with the 1983 bombing of the Marine barracks in Lebanon, followed by a plethora of spectacular terrorist attacks like the hijacking of TWA 847 to Beirut and the Achille Lauro incident, the reality of terrorism as a form of warfare was brought into our living rooms by the media.

The 1980s also saw a series of policy reactions to this onslaught of terrorist activity largely targeted against Americans or U.S. interests. The Long Commission Report, National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 138, the Vice President's Task Force on Terrorism, NSDD 207, and the recommissioning of the Vice President's Task Force on Terrorism were major milestones which shaped U.S. policy towards terrorism. Terrorism became the buzz word of the 1980s.

As we begin the decade of the 1990s, terrorism is no longer a burning issue, or is it? The drug war, the budget deficit, and the reforms in the Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc countries grab today's headlines. Have we put the terrorism genie back in its bottle never to rise again--history tells us otherwise. The terrorists, their sponsoring states and their ideological differences still remain; only the frequency of attacks and their modus operandi have changed. Bombings have replaced hijacking as the preferred method of operations. The terrorist threat still lurks and we need to keep pace with its changing nature.

This paper will provide a brief overview of the problem, detail our responses to date, review the implications for the military, and offer possible future initiatives. Four scenarios are provided in the appendix as a vehicle to foster thought and discussion of the subject. The mere fact that terrorist activities are not a major focus of our daily news speaks both to the episodic nature of the terrorist threat and the success of our present policy. Our challenge is to explore what pragmatic measures can be adopted to continue our success and carry the U.S. through the 1990s.

## BACKGROUND

A clear understanding of the terminology and associated definitions is required to avoid confusion. While common definitions of terrorism and its related areas do not exist either at an international level or within the United States Government (USG), for the purposes of this paper the Department of Defense (DOD) definitions as provided in the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Pub 1 will be used to avoid confusion.

"Terrorism: The unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence against individuals or property to coerce or intimidate governments or societies, often to achieve political, religious, or ideological objectives."

"Antiterrorism: Defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorism."

"Counterterrorism: Offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism."

"Combatting terrorism: Actions, including antiterrorism (defensive measures taken to reduce vulnerability to terrorists acts) and counterterrorism (offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism) taken to oppose terrorism throughout the entire threat spectrum."

Our present combatting terrorism policy has been developed through an evolutionary process, driven by the stark realities of the series of anti-U.S. terrorist attacks which characterized the middle 1980s. While these attacks were of an extraterritorial nature, the impact was felt throughout the nation. These incidents were the stimuli for USG policy changes on terrorism.

While not ignoring the significant terrorist events which occurred in the 1970s, to include the seizing of the American Embassy in Teheran and the failed rescue effort of DESERT ONE which resulted in changes to DOD force structure, the 1983 bombing of the U.S. Marines in Lebanon was the watershed event which led directly to our present policy stance on terrorism.



President Reagan convened the Long Commission to review the events which led to the tragic bombing of the U.S. Marines in Beirut during October 1983. The charter of the Commission was to make recommendations to improve our overall ability to thwart future terrorist attacks. Many of the findings of the Commission led to changes within governmental agencies. One finding had a far-reaching psychological effect on the U.S. military. The Long Commission recommended that the military commander be held responsible for terrorist acts carried out against his troops. The concept that the commander is responsible to integrate fully all resources at hand to prevent such occurrences reinforced the seriousness of the issue.

In 1984, the Reagan Administration issued its first National Security Decision Directive (NSDD 138) devoted exclusively to terrorism. NSDD 138 promulgated a national combatting terrorism policy to be implemented through a series of initiatives within key governmental departments. It gave clear indication that the Administration would take a more proactive stance towards the terrorism problem.

The first real test of our new policy occurred in June 1985 with the hijacking of TWA 847 to Beirut International Airport. The tragic death of a U.S. Navy diver, and the prolonged drama that finally led to the release of the remaining hostages, gave a clear indication that additional improvements were needed to confront the new form of terrorism being prosecuted against U.S. interests. As a result, the Vice President's Task Force on Combatting Terrorism was convened with Admiral Holloway as the Executive Director.

The task force's report was released in February 1986. The report provided a wealth of information as well as some clear cut conclusions and recommendations. Significant subjects covered in the report included: delineating U.S. policy and response to

terrorists; reinforcing the lead agency concept; and stressing international cooperation as the best hope for long-term success. The report was comprehensive and well received by the Administration, the Congress and the public.

NSDD 207 promulgated the recommendations contained in the Vice President's Task Force Report on Combatting Terrorism and required interim progress reports to insure all agencies complied. The recommendations were well received within the various agencies as each agency was involved in coordinating the report while it was in the draft stage.

In 1988, Vice President Bush reconvened his task force on combatting terrorism to review the sufficiency of our policy and organizational structure. The results validated USG policy and determined it was still applicable to confront the terrorist threat.

Today, the USG policy and internal organizational structure basically reflects the original concept as conceived in 1986. A few minor changes in functions and some renaming of the various groups have taken place under the Bush Administration, but the philosophical guidance and policy remains intact as the combatting terrorism framework for the environment of the 1990s.

## THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT OF THE 1990s

What is the global environment of 1990s--a multipolar world with regional instabilities? While a complete picture is not possible, a few clues are rapidly unfolding.

The first clue comes from the Soviet Union. Significant reforms are underway within the Soviet Union. A new thinking in Soviet foreign policy based upon a warming if not open relationship with the West is on the horizon. The Soviets, driven by their own internal and economic woes, seem less likely to indulge in overt adventurism and have pledged to redeploy their military forces to the homeland. How will the world, particularly the Third World, compensate for the power vacuum created by the withdrawal of Soviet influence? Historically, such moves by major powers have created a more unstable environment, one in which insurgencies and terrorism thrive. A vivid example was the series of insurgencies in Malaya, Indochina, and the Philippines which partially resulted from the power vacuum created by the defeat of the Japanese in World War II.

The second major clue is the lack of real progress in substantive negotiations in the Middle East. It's safe to say that unless some major diplomatic breakthrough is accomplished in the Middle East peace process, the turmoil and resultant international terrorism which originates from this area will continue to plague the Western world in the 1990s. Tangentially, the recent pronouncements out of Teheran indicate continuing discord between Iran and the U.S.. The proclamation by the Iranian Parliament that U.S. citizens are international criminals and should be "arrested" worldwide by Iranian citizens, forebodes increasing conflict between the U.S. and Iran and the potential for more hostage taking.

Additionally, because terrorism is a cheap form of warfare, the potential for its use as a tactic will increase. We have already seen this type of warfare prosecuted by nation-states and the drug cartel alike. As long as it pays dividends which outstrip the cost incurred, terrorism will continue to be the preferred form of power projection for those who cannot compete on a conventional plane.

Thus, the landscape of the 1990s may well be characterized by a jousting among Third World countries to fill the power vacuum created by the demise of superpower influence, with terrorism as the weapon of choice. Additionally, the present club of state sponsors of terrorism will continue to ply this avenue as long as it remains cost effective to do so; such is the broad potential of terrorist threat that may face the U.S. in the next decade.

## TERRORIST THREATS AND PATTERNS OF OPERATION

### THE THREAT

The terrorism threat is multidimensional. It stems from three major sources: state sponsored terrorism; traditional terrorist groups; and from those, like insurgents, who use terrorism as a tactic.

The most deadly is state sponsored terrorism. Nation state assistance takes many forms to include: direction, intelligence, training, sanctuary, documents, money, weapons and explosives. While various nations have found it in their interest to use or support terrorism as a foreign policy tool, the amount of support provided by those countries have been narrowed--much to the credit of our international efforts. While countries attempt to obfuscate their involvement, the following have provided some type of quantifiable support to terrorist organizations: Iran, Iraq, Libya, Syria, South Yemen, the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, Afghanistan, North Korea, Cuba and Nicaragua. Their support varies ranging from direct involvement through organizing, training, equipping and directing, to simply fulfilling secondary logistic needs.

When terrorists have access to the resources of a nation, the complexity and potential lethality of the attacks are multiplied. A partial list of state sponsored terrorist groups reads like a rogues gallery; Hizballah (Islamic Jihad), Abu Abbas's Palestinian Liberation Front (PLF), Abu Nidal Organization (ANO), Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), and Japanese Red Army (JRA). State sponsored terrorists account for some of the most heinous terrorist attacks.

The second type of terrorists can be categorized as the more classical organizational group. Their goal is to gain popular support for their radical views. They resort to

terrorism to bring attention to their cause. Examples include the Red Army Faction in West Germany, Action Direct in France, Red Brigades in Italy, and 17 November in Greece. While these groups may be involved in an inner terrorist network of trading skills and supplies, they receive very little overt third country support. Traditionally, these groups are small, politically homogeneous and operate in very small tight-knit cells. Typically, they strike within their area of influence, or the country in which they reside.

A third variant is the adroit use of terrorism by insurgent groups and criminal elements, like the drug cartel in Colombia. Terrorism is used as a tactic against civilians to undermine the government's credibility by demonstrating the government cannot protect the populace. Acts may be directed towards a change in policy or in an effort to overthrow the government. Primary examples include the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) in El Salvador, the Simon Bolivar Guerrilla Commando in Bolivia, the Shining Light in Peru, and the New People's Army (NPA) in the Philippines.

## THE PATTERN


International terrorism has grown in the last 20 years. While the growth has not been straight line, the general trend is upward at an alarming rate. Only some of this growth can be attributed to better record keeping and statistical analysis.

The following charts are extracted from the 1988 State Department's Patterns of Global Terrorism. Several points are worth highlighting. Bombing remains the preferred modus operandi. Among Americans, U.S. business is the target of choice, with diplomats and military a close second. While on the international scene the Middle East saw the most number of attacks, the majority of anti-U.S. attacks occurred in Latin America. The


number of casualties is on the increase due to the targeting of international air traffic,  
ie., the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103.

# International Terrorism Incidents, 1988


By Region




By Type of Facility



By Type of Victim




By Type of Event





## Anti-US Attacks



Extracted From  
Patterns of Global Terrorism  
 1988

## CURRENT USG POLICY

U.S. policy towards terrorism has been clear and straightforward since its promulgation in the Vice President's Task Force Report on Combatting Terrorism. The most comprehensive public statement of this policy is provided in the unclassified February 1986 Public Report of the Vice President's Task Force On Combatting Terrorism.

\*"The U.S. position on terrorism is unequivocal: firm opposition to terrorism in all its forms and wherever it takes place. Several National Security Decision Directives as well as statements by the President and senior officials confirm this policy."

\*"The U.S. Government is opposed to domestic and international terrorism and is prepared to act in concert with other nations or unilaterally when necessary to prevent or respond to terrorist acts."

\*"The U.S. Government considers the practice of terrorism by any person or group a potential threat to its national security and will resist the use of terrorism by all legal means available."

\*"States that practice terrorism or actively support it will not do so without consequence. If there is evidence that a state is mounting or intends to conduct an act of terrorism against this country, the United States will take measures to protect its citizens, property and interests."

\*"The U.S. Government will make no concessions to terrorists. It will not pay ransoms, release prisoners, change its policy or agree to other acts that might encourage additional terrorism. At the same time, the United States will use every available resource to gain the safe return of American citizens who are held hostage by terrorists."

\*"The United States will act in a strong manner against terrorists without surrendering basic freedoms or endangering democratic principles, and encourages other governments to take similar stands."

\*"U.S. policy is based upon the conviction that to give in to terrorists' demands places even more Americans at risk."

This no-concessions policy is the best way of ensuring the safety of the greatest number of people."

U.S. policy towards terrorism has not changed under the Bush Administration. This is not surprising since the policy was developed under the stewardship of then Vice President Bush. In an ongoing dynamic process, recent statements have synthesized the U.S. terrorism policy to three main elements: (1) the U.S. will not accede to terrorist demands; (2) the U.S. will apply pressure to states which sponsor terrorism; and (3) the U.S. will bring terrorists to justice.

It is obvious that while the verbiage may change, the basic position of the U.S. has not changed. Thus, the U.S. message towards terrorism has been consistent and clear--an important pillar if we are to be successful in our foreign policy initiatives to combat the problem.

## U.S. GOVERNMENT INFRASTRUCTURE

The Executive Branch of the U.S. Government is organized along functional lines to manage the international terrorist threat. Several NSDDs and policy memorandums set forth the roles and functions of the various governmental agencies. The concept is basically twofold: designate lead agencies according to the venue of the terrorist threat/incident and use the interagency structure to orchestrate overall USG activities.

Besides employing governmental agencies in their traditional roles, ie., Central Intelligence Agency for intelligence gathering, Department of Defense for military force projection overseas, etc., the Administration has designated certain agencies to lead the coordination of the USG response.

- \*"Department of State for terrorist incidents that take place outside U.S. territory.

- \* Department of Justice (FBI) for terrorist incidents that take place within U.S. territory.

- \* Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) for terrorist incidents aboard aircraft that take place within the special jurisdiction of the United States."

NOTE: The FAA is formally designated the lead agency for terrorist incidents aboard U.S. Flag carriers from the time the doors are closed for debarkation until the doors are open for embarkation. In actual practice the federal coordination to resolve a terrorist incident is handled geographically--the FBI in the U.S. and the State Department overseas.

The concept of a single coordinator or "lead agency" for combatting terrorism initiatives focuses USG efforts. While the lead agency is not in the business of directing the federal response, they act as the focal point through which information is channeled and initiatives are coordinated prior to involvement of the Executive Branch senior decision-makers. This seemingly minor point should not be overlooked since historically one crisis management failure has been the lack of coordination of

independent initiatives--a real problem in a large bureaucracy. This is especially critical during an ongoing terrorist incident where lives often hang on the delicate balance of political, military, diplomatic, and public affairs initiatives.

The day-to-day coordinating role within the USG is handled through the interagency process. The Policy Coordinating Committee on Terrorism (PCC/T) is charged with the responsibility of developing and coordinating overall U.S. policy on terrorism. The PCC/T, chaired by the State Department's National Coordinator for Terrorism, meets at least monthly to review progress in the various areas. All key governmental agencies are standing members of the PCC/T, while other agencies are invited, depending on the subject matter contained in the agenda. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict and the Special Assistant to the Chairman/JCS are standing members of the PCC/T. The PCC/T has several subgroups to help it deal with a variety of issues, such as international cooperation, research and development, legislation, public diplomacy, training programs and interagency exercises.

This coordinated approach has been mirrored in the DOD through the Antiterrorism Coordinating Committee. This committee meets periodically and provides a forum for exchanging ideas and developing policy recommendations on efforts to protect DOD personnel and their family members.

The interagency process has been the real key to the USG approach towards the terrorism problem. The regular and frequent meetings between the PCC/T principals (membership at the Deputy Assistant Secretary level) yield an ongoing working relationship which provides day-to-day continuity and during crisis cuts through much of the parochial barriers that exist in the governmental bureaucracy.

The lead agency concept and the interagency process are the pillars of the USG combatting terrorism infrastructure. The Legislative and Judicial Branches also play important roles in the overall USG structure.

The "rule of law" is the cornerstone of our combatting terrorism efforts. In this vein, the Legislative branch has passed several important laws which have strengthened the U.S. posture to combat the problem. In 1984, several pieces of legislation make certain acts of overseas terrorism, such as hostage taking and aircraft sabotage, crimes punishable in U.S. Federal Court. The Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986 provides U.S. jurisdiction over terrorist crimes committed against Americans overseas, for the first time giving the FBI extraterritorial jurisdiction over certain terrorist acts. Additionally, a special authority from Congress has made possible a large and active "rewards" program designed to compensate individuals for information leading to the arrest and conviction of individuals who commit terrorist acts against U.S. citizens or property--to date over \$1.1 million has been offered (no takers to date). Therefore, the Legislative branch has been very supportive of the USG combatting terrorism endeavor.

Likewise, the Judicial Branch has also played a significant role. Several Federal court cases have now been tried which have tested the new laws. Terrorist once arrested, have been successfully tried and received stiff sentences. Additionally, several "letters regulatory" are still pending which request the extradition of known terrorists to the U.S. for prosecution.

## FOREIGN POLICY TOOLS

The USG uses foreign policy initiatives in three basic venues to confront terrorism: multilateral groups, bilateral initiatives and unilateral actions. The most far-reaching effects of U.S. foreign policy occur in the multilateral arena.

Through international working groups of like-minded nations, such as the Summit Seven (Japan, United Kingdom, France, Italy, West Germany, Canada & the United States), the U.S. has promoted common measures designed to curb the terrorist threat. Notable successes have occurred in working with the major industrial powers to target terrorists and their sponsoring states. Specific initiatives by the Summit Seven include joint declarations against hijacking and hostage taking, intelligence sharing, diplomatic sanctions, and an internal strengthening of domestic laws which allow prosecution.

The U.S. has also been successful in working through international bodies to improve international conventions against terrorism. The U.S. and many of our allies are parties to the Hague Convention on unlawful seizing of aircraft, the Montreal Convention on civil aviation, and the Convention Against Hostage Taking. Our efforts have borne fruit in strengthening air and maritime security through the International Civil Aviation Organization and the International Maritime Organization.

In the bilateral area, the U.S. has been actively engaged in renegotiating our extradition treaties. The target is the rewording or elimination of the so-called "political exception" clause which excludes extradition of those individuals, which in the opinion of the host country, committed a crime of political nature. Besides renegotiating extradition treaties, the U.S. has been hard at work in upgrading the inherent combatting terrorism capabilities of many nations. Through the Antiterrorism

Assistance Training program administered by the State Department the U.S. has taken the lead in providing training to various elements within the governmental infrastructure of our allies. Over 6,000 civilian law enforcement officials from 45 countries have received training in such areas as basic security, bomb disposal, airport security, and incident management.

Unilateral initiatives have also been successful in setting the tone towards terrorists and their sponsors. The U.S. openly publishes a list of known terrorists, and offers rewards for their arrest and prosecution. One of the most widely publicized unilateral U.S. actions was the 1986 bombing of Libya. Statistics show that since that effort active Libyan sponsorship of terrorist activities has dropped dramatically.



## IMPLICATIONS FOR THE MILITARY

The U.S. military plays an important role in four areas within the combatting terrorism arena: policy development, counterterrorism capability, military assistance programs, and antiterrorism actions. Additionally, active involvement by the military and the USG to combat the terrorism threat is strongly favored by the public. Public opinion polls clearly indicate a preference for a proactive stance on the issue.

The U.S. military is actively involved in the policy development process through the interagency arena. Both OSD and the JCS are standing members of the PCC/T and have a direct input into the development of policy initiatives. Policy options which have a major impact on the military are worked with the Services and the CINCs through the JCS coordination process. Additionally, three military officers are assigned to the office of the National Coordinator for Terrorism to provide day-to-day continuity between the lead agency and the military element. Offices within the OSD and JCS provide a direct day-to-day link between national policy structure and our overseas military force through the Services and the Unified CINCs.

As long as terrorism remains a threat to our national security, it is vital that the military stay actively involved in the policy decision making process. Military advice is critical since (1) quite often the use of military assets is considered in implementing a policy; (2) the U.S. military presence overseas will be directly or indirectly affected by any decision reached; (3) the DOD is the potential source of any additional out-of-cycle monies required; and (4) DOD possesses the offensive capability for overseas counterterrorist responses.

The Department of Defense is the only source for much of the U.S. counterterrorism capability. As noted in the Vice President's Task Force report:

"Use of our well-trained and capable military forces offers an excellent chance of success if a military option can be implemented. Such use also demonstrates U.S. resolve to support stated national policies. Military actions may serve to deter future terrorist acts and could also encourage other countries to take a harder line. Successful employment, however, depends on timely and refined intelligence and prompt positioning of forces. Counterterrorism missions are high-risk/high-gain operations which can have a severe negative impact on U.S. prestige if they fail."

Obviously, the military must do its utmost to prepare for the counterterrorist mission should that option be required. Our forces must be highly trained, properly equipped and ready to respond on short notice. This responsibility is shared among the JCS, Services, and CINCs.

Some of the most fruitful bilateral endeavors take place through military assistance programs. The Unified CINCS Military Training Teams (MTTs) and the MILGROUPs assigned to the U.S. Embassy Country Teams are the workhorses of this effort. By working with like-minded countries the U.S. military has been able to provide advanced training in critical areas and enhance unit readiness through foreign military sales.

Working in tandem with State's Antiterrorism Assistance Training program which is targeted to the civilian structure, DOD involvement with the host countries military components rounds the overall approach. Through training and exercises fundamental and advance skills in crisis management, bomb detection and disposal, weapons skills, intelligence gathering, and incident resolution are taught. Not only does this upgrade the country's ability to combat the terrorism threat but through direct military interface we reap an indirect benefit of strengthened relations between our two countries. In

some cases this venue has been the springboard from which initiatives in other areas are developed thus enhancing our overall bilateral relationships.

The U.S. military has of necessity developed a highly sophisticated antiterrorism program. This requirement has been driven by (1) the large number of military personnel and their dependents stationed overseas; (2) the high visibility of that presence as well as high profile actions conducted by the U.S. military, which make them a priority target; and (3) a series of terrorist attacks directed against military assets and personnel ranging from general bombing to specifically targeted assassinations. As a result the DOD, Services, and CINCs have developed an interrelated antiterrorism program with specific responsibilities promulgated in DOD Directive 2000.12, Department of Defense Combatting Terrorism Program and supplemented by the Services' and CINCs' regulations.

Traditionally, antiterrorism (AT) has chiefly been an OSD/Service responsibility with the CINCs actively involved in theater oversight. The shift to increased jointness has resulted in a more active role by the Theater CINCs working with their respective air, land and sea components. What remains to close the loop effectively is more active involvement by the JCS to enhance coordination between the Services, who provide the bulk of the money for their components' AT programs, and the Theater CINCs.

The scope of defensive measures cover the gamut from basic awareness training, to the design of military construction projects, to allocation of armored vehicles, to increased basic law enforcement capabilities, to better intelligence, etc.,--a multitude of programs where considerable funds are expended. Special emphasis has been placed in integrating operations and intelligence (a fusion center), to insure threats can be actively monitored and to respond in a timely manner. Some of the Services have

instituted the fusion concept below the HQ Service level into the field where the threat can actively be worked. The DOD THREATCON System is employed as a standard to indicate the local condition of the terrorist threat. The five tier system is threat driven and contains standard response items which are modified to fit the local situation. As long as the military remains a target, antiterrorism measures provide our first line of defense.

## CONCLUSIONS

While peace may be breaking out all over, that is all over Europe, there is no clear indication this will have a significant bearing on the international terrorist threat. There is no reason to think that a warming of relations between East and West will affect what some have called a North/South problem. Certainly, the Soviets exert some influence, but one must question how much real influence they have on Middle Eastern terrorism, or with the drug cartel and insurgents who use terrorism as a tactic, or with the pure classical type of terrorist group such as the Baader Meinhof gang. In short, there is not a clear indication that the world will be more peaceful or that terrorism will simply go away.

Our present policy has resulted in significant gains over the past five years. Some forms of terrorism have noticeably decreased and we have clearly stated the USG stance on the terrorism issue. What initiatives should the USG pursue during the 1990s? How do we combat the terrorist threat in light of severe fiscal constraints that face the nation? Our basic policy is sound and is working; however, its implementation can be emended and organizational improvements can be made.

A framework for conducting such an endeavor falls in several broad areas: (a) explore low-cost methodical, organizational and functional changes to increase our efficiency; (b) investigate what role low cost technology can play to increase our effectiveness; (c) explore using dual tasked forces to replace dedicated assets; and (d) increase multilateral and bilateral initiatives to confront the terrorist threat--like our recent bilateral talks with the Soviets. Several scenarios are offered in the appendix to provide a forum for exploring possible solutions.

Additionally, specific changes may be worthy of review. Potential enhancements within the interagency arena which require study include: (a) target future bilateral terrorism exchanges by developing a regional prioritization of countries vice the present concept of accepting targets of opportunity; (b) develop an interagency list of quid pro quo objectives for specific bilateral exchanges, the objectives should be generalized goals--not a precondition for exchange; (c) designate a lead agency for low intensity conflict since the present process only really treats the symptoms (terrorism and drugs) but not the cause.

Several changes to improve the military venue also come to mind: like a full time antiterrorism focal point within the JCS to bridge the gap between the Services and the Theater CINCs; or the Air Force following the U.S. Army lead by instilling the fusion center concept at the MAJCOM level; or complete integration of all antiterrorism training under a single service. However, perhaps the best solution is to encourage a full review of both the offensive and defensive structure within the OSD, JCS, Services, and the CINCs. A full review designed to connect but streamline existing procedures, eliminate unnecessary redundancy, and improve the existing organizational structure from the top down. This review could improve the efficiency of the military to combat terrorism.

The above suggestions are not a panacea, but are offered as a springboard to foster further thought. The U.S. has enjoyed considerable success of our combatting terrorism policy over the last four years. The temptation is to adopt a passive approach. Progress must continue, for as we have seen on several occasions terrorists continue to refine their tactics and expertise.

As we consider future initiatives, it's important to realize there are no instant remedies and an overarching goal of eliminating all terrorism is not attainable. Our successful policy has been a balanced one; combining offensive and defensive measures designed to levy an unacceptable level of cost to the terrorist. Successful advancements require across the board participation and cooperation if we are going to meet the terrorist threat in a budget constrained environment--that's our challenge for the 1990s.

## APPENDIX

### ILLUSTRATIVE SCENARIOS

Several illustrative scenarios will be presented as a mechanism to provide a background for alternative analysis. These scenarios are fictitious but are designed to illustrate how foreign policy initiatives and policy options could be developed. The first scenario will explore the multilateral area.

A series of tragic aircraft bombings have swept the international airlines which transit to and from Europe. The most recent event, the downing of a Boeing 747 resulted in the deaths of 74 American citizens including 11 USG employees. Previous joint FBI and INTERPOL investigations have indicated that a new state of the art timer, which is not detectable by existing X-ray machines, may have been used to detonate the plastic explosive devices.

CIA developed information indicates the timers are manufactured by a Syrian-based firm under license from the USSR; the timer was designed for military applications and is not available on the commercial market. A similar device was used in the assassination of the US Naval attache' to Turkey in 1988 and the credit for that assassination was claimed by the Armenian Brotherhood. Additionally, special intelligence sources indicate a link between the Armenian Brotherhood (AB) and the Syrian Government over the past nine years. During that time the AB has struck numerous targets in Turkey. Further investigations indicate an active AB training camp in northern Syria.



The Deputies Committee has directed a special interagency working group be formed to develop USG alternatives. The following initiatives are under consideration:

A. Should an FBI forensics team be sent to assist in the current investigation of the latest bombing?

B. How much of the CIA held information should be released to the European intelligence agencies?

C. Should the USG advocate production of a prototype alpha ray detection system developed by the Department of Energy for use in airport baggage screening? What are the likely sources of revenue to offset the cost of the detection device if its installation is mandated by the FAA?

D. Develop a series of multilateral, bilateral and unilateral initiatives that can be used to discourage what appears to be Syrian complicity in the series of bombings.

E. What practical measures can be taken to identify and apprehend the terrorist who have been involved in the bombings?

F. What public diplomacy initiatives should be undertaken?

In the second scenario, US servicemen in the Philippines have recently become targets for assassination by MPLA guerillas. In the most recent incident three USAF servicemen were gunned down while waiting for a bus outside the gate at Clark AFB. A meeting of the DOD Antiterrorism Committee has been called in preparation for an interagency meeting on the subject. The following areas must be resolved prior to the interagency meeting:

- A. Which USG entity is responsible for the safety of USAF servicemen at Clark? CINCPAC, 13th AF, the USAF, JCS, DOD, or the Embassy?
- B. Who should take the lead in developing military alternatives in the Pacific theater and in Washington?
- C. How will the implementation of initiatives be reported, through the Service channels, through JCS channels, or through the State Department channels?
- D. What possible unilateral US military defensive measures can be developed?
- E. What type assistance could the US military offer the government of the Philippines?
- F. What other US actions should the military recommend?

The M-19 terrorist organization has been actively seeking the overthrow of the Colombian government. The M-19 has been linked to providing protection of drug processing facilities and the movement of drug shipments within Columbia. A recent wave of terrorist attacks has been conducted by the M-19 in support of the drug cartel efforts to cancel the U.S./Colombian extradition treaty. The Colombian government is reeling from the terrorist attacks of the M-19 and the drug cartel's bombing and assassination attacks.

Bolstering the government of Colombia (GOC) against the onslaught of M-19 and drug cartel attacks has become a priority within the Administration. The following areas are under consideration:

A. Is the problem in Colombia a drug issue, a terrorism issue, or an insurgency issue? Who will chair the coordination of USG efforts to assist the GOC? What role should be assigned to the State Department Office of Inter-American Affairs? What other USG entities should be involved?

B. Should an interagency team be dispatched to Colombia to assess the situation and develop a course of action?

C. What mechanisms presently exist within the USG structure to provide assistance?

D. What should be the Administration's public diplomacy stance? Who should coordinate the implementation of the strategy?

In the next scenario, a Greek-registered cruise ship which boarded passengers in Miami, Florida for a Caribbean cruise was hijacked during a stop over in Antigua. The last communication from the terrorists aboard the vessel demanded the release of several terrorists from the 17 November terrorist organization presently being held in jail in Greece. A DF position based on the radio transmissions place the vessel adjacent to US territorial waters just north of the US Virgin Islands. The President will meet with selected members of the National Security Council to review the situation in three hours. The following areas require resolution before the meeting:

- A. Which nation has the primary responsibility to resolve the terrorist incident?
- B. What type of initiatives can be taken to resolve the incident?
- C. What agency within the USG has responsibility to take the lead in coordinating USG initiatives?
- D. How will the concerns of the families of the passengers be addressed?
- E. The White House Press Office has been deluged with inquiries? What public diplomacy guidance should be provided?

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**PUBLIC REPORT  
OF THE  
VICE PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE  
ON COMBATTING TERRORISM**

**FEBRUARY 1986**

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For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office  
Washington, D.C. 20402

# The Growing Threat of Terrorism

*"We the people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America."*

The basic principles of freedom, justice and concern for human life on which our nation was founded have survived major threats during the course of America's history. Today, we face a unique and pervasive challenge to these ideals in the form of terrorism, an increasingly serious threat to the United States and its friends and allies around the world.

## THE NATURE OF TERRORISM

Terrorism is a phenomenon that is easier to describe than define. It is the unlawful use or threat of violence against persons or property to further political or social objectives. It is generally intended to intimidate or coerce a government, individuals or groups to modify their behavior or policies.

The terrorist's methods may include hostage-taking, aircraft piracy or sabotage, assassination, threats, hoaxes, indiscriminate bombings or shootings. Yet, most victims of terrorism seldom have a role in either causing or affecting the terrorist's grievances.

Some experts see terrorism as the lower end of the warfare spectrum, a form of low-intensity, unconventional aggression. Others, however, believe that referring to it as war rather than criminal activity lends dignity to terrorists and places their acts in the context of accepted international behavior.

While neither the United States nor the United Nations has adopted official definitions of terrorism, Americans readily recognize the bombing of an embassy, political hostage-taking and most hijackings of an aircraft as terrorist acts. They realize that terrorism needs an audience; that it is propaganda designed to shock and stun them; that it is behavior that is uncivilized and lacks respect for human life. They also believe that terrorism constitutes a growing danger to our system, beliefs and policies worldwide.

## PROFILE OF A TERRORIST

The motivations of those who engage in terrorism are many and varied, with activities spanning industrial societies to underdeveloped regions. Fully 60 percent of the Third World population is under 20 years of age; half are 15 years or less. These population pressures create a volatile mixture of youthful aspirations that when coupled with economic and political frustrations help form a large pool of potential terrorists. Many terrorists have a deep belief in the justice of their cause. They are tough and vicious and may have little regard for their own lives or those of their victims in attempting to achieve their goals. Others may even be hired assassins.

Terrorists generally get their weapons from a largely unregulated international arms market but also resort at times to illegal methods. They acquire timely information on targets and countermeasures. Lately, they have resorted to unprecedented violent attacks and, when government security efforts against them become more effective, they simply shift to easier targets.

While there are several ways to categorize terrorists, for purposes of this report three main categories are used: self-supported, state-sponsored or aided, and those individuals who may engage in terrorism for limited tactical purposes.

Self-supported terrorists primarily rely on their own initiatives, such as extortion, kidnapping, bank robberies and narcotics trafficking to support their activities.

Terrorists lacking state sponsorship, aid or safehaven tend to be extremely security conscious, keeping their numbers small to avoid penetration efforts.

State-sponsored or aided terrorist groups frequently are larger in numbers, have the advantage of protection by state agencies and are able to access state intelligence resources. Because of this host country-provided safehaven and the compartmented operations of terrorist organizations, it is extremely difficult to penetrate such groups. Moreover, they are subject to limited control by their sponsors and may be expected to carry out attacks for them.

The reasons for state support and use of such groups are many. Terrorism has become another means of conducting foreign affairs. Such terrorists are agents whose association the state can easily deny. Use of terrorism by the country entails few risks, and constitutes strong-arm, low-budget foreign policy. Growing government assistance in arms, explosives, communications, travel documents, safehaven and training of fanatics are the types of aid that state-supported terrorists receive.

Some individuals or groups may choose to engage in terrorist violence in the context of activities such as national insurgency, especially when they may be losing a conflict, to try to create a special effect, embarrass opposing leadership, or change the pace of events.

The most deadly terrorists continue to operate in and from the Middle East. In 1985 they were involved in roughly 50 percent of the total worldwide terrorist incidents. The two main sources are militant Shi'ites from various Middle Eastern countries, especially Lebanon, supported to varying degrees by Iran or Syria; and radical Palestinian elements, principally offshoots of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), often with direct support from Libya, Syria or Iran. Others, such as independent agents of governments like Libya, also conduct terrorist operations.


Middle East terrorist groups have three main targets: Israel; Western governments and citizens, particularly the United States, France, Italy, and the United Kingdom; and moderate Arab governments and officials, particularly those of Jordan, Egypt, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.

Many terrorist organizations have continued to operate in Europe during the past decade, including the Italian Red Brigade, French Direct Action, German Red Army Faction and the Provisional Irish Republican Army. The latter has been and remains the most active.



# Geographic Distribution of International Terrorist Incidents

1985



Established leftist groups in Spain, Portugal and Greece continue their terrorist campaigns, while a new group has surfaced in Belgium, a country hitherto relatively free from terrorism. Recently, there have been disturbing indications that leftwing terrorists of several nationalities are beginning to cooperate and coordinate their attacks. Of the 812 incidents worldwide in 1985, over 200 took place in Western Europe.


In Latin America, social, economic and political turmoil have prolonged existing patterns of insurgency as well as international and domestic terrorism in several countries, particularly El Salvador, Colombia, Guatemala, Chile and Peru. Nicaragua and Cuba also have been implicated in terrorist activity in the region. During 1985 there were more terrorist incidents (86) directed at U.S. citizens in Latin America than anywhere else.

Certain governments have demonstrated a growing propensity to use, support and exploit terrorism as an instrument of national policy. This trend toward the alignment of interests between certain states and terrorist groups has markedly elevated threat levels worldwide, as state and financial resources have expanded terrorists' capabilities.

## INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

Terrorism is as old as recorded history, but the past two decades have witnessed a dramatic increase in international terrorist acts by people and by governments in the pursuit of their goals. The past year saw the number of terrorist incidents reach a high of 812.

### International Terrorist Incidents 1980-1985




Half of the worldwide incidents in the 1980s were aimed at only 10 countries; one-third of the total were targeted directly at the United States. The number of terrorist acts has generally risen since official statistics were first compiled in 1968, with a trend toward bloodier incidents with more fatalities. Attacks caused 20 fatalities in 1968 compared to 926 in 1985.

Incidents in 1985 demonstrated that terrorism is increasingly directed against the Western democracies. The June 14, 1985, hijacking of TWA Flight 847 shortly after it left Athens was the first hijacking of a U.S. airliner in the Middle East since 1970. In addition, the hijackings of Egyptair Flight 648 and the *Achille Lauro*, the bombing of a restaurant on the outskirts of Madrid frequented by American servicemen and the shooting of the off-duty Marine Corps personnel in El Salvador demonstrate that Americans are being specifically targeted. The year ended with the brutal attacks in the Vienna and Rome airports where five Americans were murdered.

During the past decade, terrorists have attacked U.S. officials or installations abroad approximately once every 17 days. In the past 17 years, terrorists have killed as many U.S. diplomats as were killed in the previous 180 years.

## U.S. Casualties Resulting From International Terrorist Incidents 1980-1985



In 1982, a total of 57 attacks were directed against U.S. military personnel, resulting in two deaths. In 1983, even more incidents occurred (65), and 241 deaths resulted from one incident. In that bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut, the United States lost nearly as many servicemen as the British lost in the entire Falklands campaign.

### DOMESTIC VULNERABILITY

While the number of terrorist acts outside our borders increased dramatically in the last three years, incidents within the United States have declined from 51 acts in 1982 to only seven in 1985. And while 23 Americans overseas lost their lives to terrorists last year, only two citizens were killed within our own borders. This can be attributed in part to the success of the Department of Justice and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in their counterterrorist activities. Additionally, it appears that international terrorist groups find it easier and safer to target Americans overseas rather than within the United States. In 1985, there were 23 terrorist incidents prevented in the United States by the timely action of the FBI and other law enforcement agencies.

FBI efforts in 1985 included the foiling of a plot to assassinate Prime Minister Rajiv Ghandi of India while visiting the United States; the uncovering of a pro-Qaddafi conspiracy to carry out three assassinations and to bomb strategic locations in the United States; the interdiction of a Sikh assassination plot in New Orleans; and the prevention of planned bombings in India by the same group.

## Terrorist Incidents in the United States 1980-1985

<u>Date</u>	<u>Total Incidents</u>	<u>Killed</u>	<u>Injured</u>
1980	29	1	19
1981	42	1	4
1982	51	7	26
1983	31	6	4
1984	13	0	0
1985	7	2	10

Over the years the FBI has become increasingly involved in "special events" of national and international interest that take place in the United States and which could serve as an attractive target against terrorism. The Pan American games in San Juan, Puerto Rico, were the first such event where the FBI took precautions against terrorism. Others have been the New Orleans World's Fair and the two 1984 national political conventions in San Francisco and Dallas.

The 1984 Olympic Games in Los Angeles, with a record 140 countries participating, received close scrutiny by the FBI and other federal agencies. The federal law enforcement community worked in conjunction with local and state officials to coordinate the flow of intelligence regarding possible terrorist movements and attacks. Contingency plans were developed for an emergency response to any incident that might have occurred.

Despite this outstanding track record in combatting terrorism internally, our vulnerability remains. In fact, while the losses from terrorist attacks are minimal compared to the 40,000 highway deaths or 18,000 murders that occur annually in this country, there is more at risk than the senseless loss of lives.

Terrorism is political theater designed to undermine or alter governmental authority or behavior. The apparent inability of established governments to respond effectively to incidents affects the confidence of citizens and allies alike. America's foes take comfort in the apparent weaknesses of our society that terrorism exposes.

Our vulnerability lies, ironically, in the strength of our open society and highly sophisticated infrastructure. Transportation, energy, communications, finance, industry, medicine, defense, diplomacy and government itself rely on intricate interrelated networks. Given these inherent vulnerabilities, and the fact that Americans are increasingly the targets of terrorist attacks outside the United States, it is apparent that a potentially serious domestic threat exists. Recent threats such as Qaddafi's statement that Libyans will attack "American citizens in their own streets" only serve to underscore this worsening climate.

# U.S. Policy and Response to Terrorists

Since no country is immune to terrorism, it is imperative that governments have the appropriate policies, intelligence and flexible response options to deal effectively with terrorist acts. Trained personnel and programs must be in place before, during and after each crisis, both to respond to the problem and to answer inevitable criticism in the event of failure. Long-term policies to achieve these objectives are costly, complicated and difficult, yet essential as a defense against the importation of terrorism from overseas.

## CURRENT POLICY

The U.S. position on terrorism is unequivocal: firm opposition to terrorism in all its forms and wherever it takes place. Several National Security Decision Directives as well as statements by the President and senior officials confirm this policy:

- The U.S. Government is opposed to domestic and international terrorism and is prepared to act in concert with other nations or unilaterally when necessary to prevent or respond to terrorist acts.
- The U.S. Government considers the practice of terrorism by any person or group a potential threat to its national security and will resist the use of terrorism by all legal means available.
- States that practice terrorism or actively support it will not do so without consequence. If there is evidence that a state is mounting or intends to conduct an act of terrorism against this country, the United States will take measures to protect its citizens, property and interests.
- The U.S. Government will make no concessions to terrorists. It will not pay ransoms, release prisoners, change its policies or agree to other acts that might encourage additional terrorism. At the same time, the United States will use every available resource to gain the safe return of American citizens who are held hostage by terrorists.
- The United States will act in a strong manner against terrorists without surrendering basic freedoms or endangering democratic principles, and encourages other governments to take similar stands.

U.S. policy is based upon the conviction that to give in to terrorists' demands places even more Americans at risk. This no-concessions policy is the best way of ensuring the safety of the greatest number of people.

## EVOLUTION OF POLICY

U.S. policy on terrorism has evolved through years of experience in combatting terrorism and is an outgrowth of responses by various Administrations.

Following the terrorist attacks at the 1972 Munich Olympics, President Nixon established a Cabinet-level committee, chaired by the Secretary of State, to combat terrorism. Later during the Carter Administration this group was replaced with a more responsive program coordinated by the National Security Council. The program was designed to ensure interagency coordination and established the Lead Agency concept for managing terrorist incidents.

The Carter Administration also established a 10-member senior-level Interagency Executive Committee on Terrorism that eventually evolved into a group of more than 30 government organizations. The Committee was subsequently restructured along more functional lines.

During the first year of President Reagan's Administration, an organizational structure for crisis management was established with a group chaired by the Vice President and supported by appropriate interagency working groups.

In April 1982, the President refined specific Lead Agency responsibilities for coordination of the Federal response to terrorist incidents:

- Department of State—incidents that take place outside U.S. territory
- Department of Justice (FBI)—incidents that take place within U.S. territory
- Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)—incidents aboard aircraft that take place within the special jurisdiction of the United States.

In addition to the Lead Agency responsibilities, a number of interagency groups to facilitate coordination were established, including the Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism, to develop and coordinate overall U.S. policy on terrorism. Chaired by the Department of State, the group meets frequently to deal with issues such as international cooperation, research and development, legislation, public diplomacy, training programs and antiterrorist exercises.

The Antiterrorist Assistance Program was established in 1983 to provide counterterrorism training and law enforcement assistance to friendly foreign governments.

## **RANGE OF RESPONSES TO TERRORISM**

Terrorism requires a coordinated national response on three levels. First, the immediate problem of managing incidents must include measures taken before, during and after the event. Second, coping with the threat is a long-term task that involves protecting people and property, reducing threat levels, and influencing the users and sponsors of terrorism to desist. Finally, there is the challenge of identifying and alleviating the causes of terrorism.

### **Managing Terrorist Incidents**

While not applicable in every case, the options for managing terrorist incidents are:

- Preemption—Such actions are designed to keep an attack from occurring. Preemptive success is limited by the extent to which timely, accurate intelligence is available. Every-

day activities that can preempt attacks include altering travel routes or avoiding routine schedules. Successful preemption of terrorist attacks is seldom publicized because of the sensitive intelligence that may be compromised.

- **Delay**—Sometimes avoiding specific reactions until the circumstances are favorable is the best course. Delaying tactics are used during a terrorist incident in order to stall for time to position forces, keep the terrorists off balance, or develop other responses. Such tactics are particularly valuable when time is important to secure international cooperation in order to apply economic, diplomatic, legal or military pressures.
- **Third-Party Arrangements**—When incidents occur overseas the host country has primary responsibility for managing the situation. In other cases, for diplomatic or political reasons, the use of third-parties may offer the best opportunity for successful resolution of the incident.
- **Negotiating**—The United States has a clear policy of no concessions to terrorists as the best way to protect the greatest number of people. However, the United States Government has always stated that it will talk to anyone and use every available resource to gain the release of Americans held hostage.
- **Counterattacking or Force Options**—Forceful resolution of a terrorist incident can be risky as evidenced by the recent episode involving the Egyptian airliner on Malta; careful planning and accurate, detailed intelligence are required to minimize risks.

Our principles of justice will not permit random retaliation against groups or countries. However, when perpetrators of terrorism can be identified and located, our policy is to act against terrorism without surrendering basic freedoms or endangering democratic values. We are prepared to act in concert with other nations, or unilaterally when necessary, to prevent or respond to terrorist acts. A successful deterrent strategy may require judicious employment of military force to resolve an incident.

Recent legislation has greatly expanded federal criminal jurisdiction over international terrorist incidents involving U.S. citizens. Violent terrorist acts are crimes. Accordingly, the United States will make every effort to investigate, apprehend and prosecute terrorists as criminals.

### **Coping with the Threat**

Dealing effectively with terrorism requires long-term measures for providing physical and personal security, training personnel, and enlisting the cooperation of other governments in protective measures, in gathering and sharing intelligence and in the elimination of terrorist threats.

The growth in frequency and violence of terrorist acts has increased physical and personal security costs, and changed lifestyles and work habits. Expenditures for security programs have grown sharply, but attacks against U.S. personnel and facilities in the Middle East, Europe and Latin America show that more must be done to provide security systems and to sensitize and train employees to better manage the threat.

Cooperation with host governments is essential, since they have the primary responsibility for providing security for U.S. citizens and facilities abroad. Their ability to monitor and

control terrorist activities, as well as participate in cooperative measures to collect and share intelligence, is extremely important. Improving aviation and other international security programs and sharing benefits of terrorism-related research and development are equally critical. Securing cooperation in applying political or economic pressures on states that sponsor terrorism is a difficult yet vital part of the overall program.

### **Alleviating Causes of Terrorism**

Terrorism is motivated by a range of real and perceived injustices that span virtually every facet of human activity. The resulting grievances provide the basis for recruitment and the terrorists' justification of violence. A cooperative international effort to mitigate the sources of grievances, such as pursuing the peace process in the Middle East, is an essential yet complicated and long-term objective. The issues are complex, highly emotional and seldom amenable to outside solutions. However, efforts that promote democratic societies with guaranteed personal freedoms continue to be the cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy.

### **U.S. RESOURCES FOR COMBATTING TERRORISM**

Most resources committed to combatting terrorism are incorporated into a variety of diplomatic, military, legal and law enforcement programs. As a result, a precise identification of U.S. Government resources devoted to terrorism alone is difficult. At present more than 150 specific activities to combat terrorism are carried out by various federal departments and agencies.

Since 1970, federal expenditures to combat terrorism have increased severalfold. While it is extremely difficult to break out specific activities from those agencies that perform multiple functions, about \$2 billion was spent in 1985 to combat terrorism both at home and abroad. The total number of people—calculated in terms of man-years—assigned to these various programs in 1985 was approximately 18,000.

The majority of the 150 activities included in this country's effort to combat terrorism fall within eight broad categories: research and development; administration and support; command, control and communications; intelligence; personnel security; physical security; counterterrorist operations; and education and training.

While agency estimates for funding and manpower needs for most of the categories are projected to continue at modest rates of growth through 1990, substantial increases in funding and manpower for physical security are expected at home and abroad.

Other program emphasis during this period is projected to occur in the following areas:

- More law enforcement, prosecution of terrorists
- Better security for civil aviation and maritime activities
- Increased assistance to other governments
- Better, more timely intelligence



Historically, security concerns have not received the high priority from government that they do today. Over the past few years, the dramatically changing situation has resulted in vastly increased financial and human resource expenditures to deal with the threat. By 1990, physical and personal security funding is expected to make up 40 percent of our resources committed to combatting terrorism.

## **PERSONAL AND PHYSICAL SECURITY**

Several federal and local government agencies are responsible for domestic protection of foreign missions, resident diplomats and visiting dignitaries. Although excellent relations exist, occasional coordination problems occur among agencies of the federal and local government. This affects reciprocal foreign government protection provided U.S. visitors, personnel and installations. Decisions to resolve the problems of overlapping jurisdictions are complicated and require comprehensive study.

Frequent and violent attacks overseas have become a major concern. Necessary reliance on host country protection of U.S. installations and personnel, the most visible and difficult to protect terrorist targets, complicates the security issue. U.S. efforts to minimize vulnerabilities, increase awareness, and provide maximum protection have, nonetheless, made progress.

For example, the Secretary of State's Advisory Panel on Overseas Security convened in 1984 with a mandate to consider the full range of issues related to improving the security of U.S. interests abroad and protecting foreign visitors at home. The recommendations, many already implemented, concern organizational structure, responsibility assignments, personnel systems, training, equipment, accountability and physical strengthening of facilities. The physical security program alone, which would modify existing structures and require some new buildings, is currently budgeted for \$2.7 billion over the next five years.

## **FEDERAL AGENCIES' ROLES IN COMBATting TERRORISM**

Most agencies' activities related to combatting terrorism are closely meshed with their other national security functions. To a large extent, their resources are also used for normal diplomatic initiatives, law enforcement, intelligence collection and analysis, research and development, and broad crisis management functions.

The National Security Council (NSC) advises the President on national security matters. Working closely with concerned interagency groups such as the Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism and the Crisis Pre-planning Group, it also coordinates the development and implementation of programs to combat terrorist attacks or threats. In the event of a terrorist incident, the NSC staff serves as liaison between the White House and the responsible Lead Agency.

As previously mentioned, three Lead Agency assignments are in place for managing terrorist incidents: the Department of State for incidents occurring outside the United States; the Department of Justice (FBI) for incidents within the United States; and the Federal Aviation Administration of the Department of Transportation for hijacked aircraft in flight.

Lead Agencies assume coordination responsibilities in addition to their statutory functions. The Lead Agency cannot exercise exclusive jurisdiction, but has the lead because of primary operational and policy responsibilities in the area concerned. It is expected to discharge its own functions and ensure that interests of other departments and agencies are reflected in recommendations to the National Security Council. Between incidents, the Lead Agency works with other agencies to develop policy approaches, maintain necessary relationships with other governments and organizations, keep current on intelligence and other developments in the field, and maintain a readiness to respond whenever an incident occurs. During an incident, the Lead Agency establishes and maintains a Working Group to coordinate with other agencies and to discharge its own primary responsibilities. Accordingly, State, the FBI and the FAA maintain operations centers with staff support, secure and nonsecure voice communications, and satellite capabilities worldwide.

The specific functions of each of the Lead Agencies, as well as those of other key federal departments, agencies and interagency working groups that are part of the national program are covered in detail in Appendix II.

## **INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION**

The national program to combat terrorism operates before, during and after an incident. Any strategy must include measures for deterrence, crisis management and response options. The first line of defense in every phase is international cooperation.

International cooperation offers the best hope for long-term success. More and more states recognize that unilateral programs for combatting terrorism are not sufficient. Without a viable, comprehensive, cooperative effort, terrorism and its supporters will benefit from the uncoordinated actions of its victims. International cooperation alone cannot eliminate terrorism, but it can complicate the terrorists' tasks, deter their efforts and save lives. In fact, numerous actual or planned attacks against U.S. or foreign targets have failed or were circumvented through multinational cooperation.

The United States pursues international cooperation through bilateral or multilateral agreements with like-minded nations and by serving as a member of various international organizations.

The United States has found the best multilateral forum for the discussion of terrorism to be the industrialized democracies which constitute the Summit Seven (United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, France, West Germany, Italy and Japan). This group has issued four joint declarations of unity (Bonn, 1978; Venice, 1980; Ottawa, 1981; and London, 1984), which have outlined areas of common concern. Additionally, the United States is looking for ways in which it can cooperate more closely with other countries outside this group. For example, there was strong emphasis in 1978 on anti-hijacking measures. The Bonn Declaration, signed in July 1978 by the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy and Japan, called for member countries to terminate civilian airline service to any country failing to prosecute or extradite a hijacker.

On December 9, 1985, the United Nations General Assembly, with strong U.S. support, passed by consensus vote its first unequivocal resolution condemning terrorism. Eleven days later the U.N. Security Council adopted a U.S.-initiated resolution condemning

unequivocally all acts of hostage-taking and urging the further development of international cooperation among states to facilitate the prevention, prosecution and punishment of hostage-taking as international terrorism. While such resolutions lack implementing procedures and are thus largely symbolic, they are important to the development of a consensus among all nations that terrorism is unacceptable international behavior.

Another important international initiative is the State Department's Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program designed to enhance the ability of foreign governments to deal with the security and crisis management aspects of terrorism.

Substantial progress in international cooperation also has been made in the areas of aviation and maritime security. For example, in June 1985, following the hijacking of TWA Flight 847, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) moved quickly to upgrade its Standards and Recommended Practices for airport and aircraft security. The Departments of State and Transportation are seeking ways to take legal action against countries that do not maintain adequate airport security or refuse to extradite or prosecute hijackers. Procedures also are under consideration to provide international inspection teams to examine airport security arrangements worldwide.

In November 1985, following the hijacking of the *Achille Lauro*, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) acting on a U.S. initiative directed its Maritime Safety Committee to develop, on a priority basis, measures for the protection of passengers and crews aboard ships. Additionally, an interagency working group, chaired by the Department of Transportation, was established to assess worldwide port and shipping security. Its recommendations are being worked through the IMO, with bilateral and multilateral security initiatives being pursued as needed.

## CONSIDERATIONS IN DETERMINING RESPONSES

The United States can retaliate politically, economically and militarily. The utility of these actions depends in great measure on cooperation from other countries, but they can have a positive, long-range deterrent effect.

Use of our well-trained and capable military forces offers an excellent chance of success if a military option can be implemented. Such use also demonstrates U.S. resolve to support stated national policies. Military actions may serve to deter future terrorist acts and could also encourage other countries to take a harder line. Successful employment, however, depends on timely and refined intelligence and prompt positioning of forces. Counter-terrorism missions are high-risk/high-gain operations which can have a severe negative impact on U.S. prestige if they fail.

A U.S. military show of force may intimidate the terrorists and their sponsors. It would not immediately risk more U.S. lives or prestige and could be more effective if utilized in concert with diplomatic, political or economic sanctions. There are, however, some distinct disadvantages: a show of force could be considered gunboat diplomacy, which might be perceived as a challenge rather than a credible threat; it may require a sizable deployment of support activities; it may provide our enemies with a subject for anti-American propaganda campaigns worldwide; and most important, an active military response may prove necessary to resolve the situation if a show of force fails.

Political or economic sanctions directed against sponsoring states offer the least direct danger to lives and property and are more likely than military force to gain international support. Such sanctions could stimulate domestic opposition to a government's support for terrorists, particularly if multinational in character. However, multilateral sanctions are difficult to organize and even then may not be effective. Further, they could unify the country against the United States, since sanctions often harm the general populace more than terrorists. In every case the advantages of sanctions must be weighed against other foreign policy objectives.

## INTELLIGENCE

Success in combatting terrorism is predicated on the availability of timely and accurate intelligence. One approach to assuring timely information in combatting terrorism involves conventional human and technical intelligence capabilities that penetrate terrorist groups and their support systems, including a sponsoring state's activities. An equally important approach is through investigative police efforts. Collecting tactical police intelligence aids in monitoring terrorists' activities and may be crucial to tracking subnational groups or small terrorist bands. The national intelligence effort relies heavily on collection and liaison arrangements that exist with many friendly governments. This effort must be augmented with the results of investigative police work and law enforcement liaison arrangements, which are currently being expanded.

Long-term intelligence programs to combat terrorism involve collection and analysis that address regional history, culture, religion, politics, psychology, security conditions, law enforcement and diplomatic relationships. The requirement for accurate analysis applies both to long-term threat assessments and to support incident management. All terrorism-related intelligence collection and analysis must be directed toward production and dissemination of clear, concise, and accurate threat warnings and assessments to decision-makers in time for them to take necessary action.

# **The Role of Congress in Combatting Terrorism**

Terrorism is a bipartisan issue and as the threat has increased, so has the resolve of Congress to ensure appropriate punishment of terrorists. In recent years, Congress and the Executive Branch have worked closely together to close existing statutory loopholes in our ability to prosecute terrorists and reduce their sources of support.

## **CURRENT LEGISLATION**

In 1984, several significant bills were passed that have enabled the United States to expand its jurisdiction over terrorists. These bills have greatly enhanced the U.S. role in prosecution of hijackers, making it a federal offense to commit an act of violence against any passenger on a government or civilian aircraft. The U.S. also now has the authority to prosecute any person who destroys a foreign aircraft outside of the United States if the terrorist is later found in this country.

Legislation covering crimes against the families of high-ranking federal officials provides for the prosecution of acts of violence against the immediate family members of the President, Vice President, Members of Congress, all federal judges, the heads of executive agencies, the Director of the CIA and federal law enforcement officials.

New 1984 "Murder-for-Hire" legislation makes it possible for the United States to prosecute anyone who travels or uses transportation or communications facilities in interstate or foreign commerce with the intent to murder for compensation.

The Attorney General and the Secretary of State received new authority from Congress in 1984 to reward any individual for information leading to the arrest and conviction of any person who committed terrorist acts against U.S. citizens or property. The Attorney General has delegated this authority to the Director of the FBI. The State Department currently has a \$3 million budget to pay rewards in international terrorism cases.

Since January 1, 1985, the International Traffic in Arms Regulations have been expanded to require a license for anyone in the United States to train any foreign national (who is not a permanent resident alien of the United States) in the use, maintenance, repair or construction of any item included on a specified list of munitions.

## **PENDING LEGISLATION**

There are several significant initiatives in the Congress that are aimed at correcting many of the remaining statutory shortfalls. If passed, they could give the Administration greater capability in the legal battle against terrorism.

One of the major pieces of legislation that is under consideration is an amendment to the Hostage-Taking Act of 1984. This measure permits a death penalty if a terrorist takes the life of a person during a hostage-taking situation. The present maximum penalty is life imprisonment, even if a hostage is killed.

Another legislative measure would significantly expand federal criminal jurisdiction to allow prosecution of any terrorist who kills, seriously assaults, or kidnaps a U.S. citizen outside the United States, or conspires outside of the United States to murder an American citizen within the United States.

Recent decisions of U.S. courts have blocked the extradition of persons accused or convicted of terrorist acts abroad on the grounds that their violent crimes, including murder, were political offenses. Moreover, similar provisions in foreign extradition laws have frustrated efforts to bring accused terrorists to this country for trial. To correct this situation, the United States has begun negotiations with selected countries to revise extradition treaties to preclude the use of the political offense exception in cases involving violent crime.

Another pending initiative would permit nuclear reactor licensees access to FBI criminal history files. The review of these files could prevent hiring known or suspected criminals or terrorists to fill sensitive positions.

## **POTENTIAL LEGISLATION**

Two areas require review to determine whether legislation or other administrative measures are necessary. The first is airport and port security. Continuous review and upgrade of security measures are needed; however, no federal statutes currently mandate development of measures to protect ports, vessels, passengers or crew members.

The second is a review of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) to determine the validity of reported abuses. It is alleged that terrorists and terrorist organizations, in addition to unfriendly foreign governments, have used the Act to gain sensitive information. Should a review confirm such abuses, a revision will be required.

One area in which there is concern both in Congress and the Executive Branch is the issue of Congressional oversight of proposed counterterrorist operations. It may be appropriate to pursue informal discussions between the Congress and Executive Branch to clarify reporting and oversight requirements in this area. Because hostage rescue and counterterrorist operations are sensitive and involve a variety of different circumstances, no set of specific procedures would be appropriate in all cases.

Legislation calling for the formation of a Joint Committee on Intelligence has been introduced in the House, but is still in the early stages of development. The advantages are essentially twofold—streamlined procedures for intelligence oversight and reduced numbers of people who have access to sensitive information.

Finally, consideration should be given to legislation which gives the federal government primary jurisdiction over terrorist acts committed against federal officials and property as well as against foreign officials and facilities within the United States.

# Viewpoint of the American People

Terrorism deeply troubles the American people. A Roper Poll conducted before the TWA 847 hijacking showed that 78 percent of all Americans consider terrorism to be one of the most serious problems facing the U.S. Government today, along with the deficit, strategic arms control and unemployment.

Public sentiment about how to deal with terrorism also has political ramifications. The Iranian hostage situation demonstrated the political liabilities in failing to meet the expectations of American citizens. The standing of British Prime Minister Thatcher's government was enhanced in the aftermath of the 1980 rescue of the hostages at the Iranian Embassy in London. A Washington Post-ABC news poll showed that President Reagan received a large boost in standings from his success in dealing with the *Achille Lauro* hijacking—80 percent said they approved of the action. Frustration was also evident in the same poll with many Americans skeptical that apprehension of the hijackers would do much to alleviate terrorism.

Attacks on Americans in Beirut in 1983 and 1984 precipitated national grief and public frustration and resulted in significant changes in our foreign policy in the Middle East. The Americans currently held hostage in Lebanon continue to receive the concern of the American people and the highest priority of the U.S. Government.

A special group interview project, conducted in November 1985, helped to document the attitude of the American public. Individuals interviewed do not believe that terrorism has a direct effect on their lives, but the indirect effects evoked strong reactions. Americans feel fearful, vulnerable, victimized and angry. Most of all, they are frustrated by a sense of helplessness.

Also, the research project shows that Americans believe terrorism affects perception of the United States as a powerful country and world leader. Terrorism reduces America's status to being seen as a "pawn"—powerless, easily manipulated and at the mercy of attackers because Americans cannot or do not fight back.

The President is seen as ultimately responsible for fighting terrorism, although the group polled recognizes that government agencies are also involved. Most believe that the government is responsible for keeping them safe wherever they go.

Even though those Americans surveyed believe the government is virtually helpless when it comes to catching terrorists, they feel something should be done. Solutions recommended include international cooperation among countries including economic sanctions, and tighter security at airports and aboard aircraft. Active measures such as military actions are much more controversial among those interviewed, although welcomed by many.

With regard to policy on terrorism, most responded that there was no cohesive policy, but said there should be one. There is an awareness that the United States will not negotiate with terrorists. Those interviewed believe a policy on terrorism should reflect national values: respect for individual life, respect for law, and respect for the sovereignty of nations.

Under the umbrella of such a policy, Americans would still welcome actions against terrorists that are swift, forceful and even aggressive. There is growing evidence the American people support timely, well-conceived, well-executed operations, such as the capture of the *Achille Lauro* hijackers. They endorse similar actions even if inadvertent casualties result.

Also, those surveyed think Americans need to be made aware and reassured that U.S. counterterrorist forces are highly trained and capable.



# Terrorism and the Media

Terrorism is a form of propaganda, demanding publicity to be effective. Among the factors cited for the increases in both the number and sensational nature of incidents is the terrorists' success in achieving wider publicity and influencing a much broader audience. Terrorists see the media's role in conveying their messages worldwide as essential to achieving their goals. If the violence is spectacular, wide coverage is usually assured.

Terrorist acts are newsworthy, and the media see coverage as a professional, competitive responsibility. Some in the media have claimed that intense coverage helps to resolve an incident and that putting the hostages on television may actually save their lives. The other side of this argument is that untimely or inaccurate information released by the media can interfere with resolution of an incident, foreclose options for dealing with it, or unwittingly provide intelligence information to terrorists, which prolongs an incident or endangers lives.

It is essential, therefore, that the government and the media cooperate during a terrorist incident, which almost inevitably involves risk to human lives, human rights and national interests.

One difficulty for the press is that it cannot provide accurate coverage that takes into account risk to government action unless it has some accurate sense of what the government is attempting. Government thus can assist by providing as much timely, factual information as the situation allows.

Media practices that can lead to problems during an incident are:

- Saturation television coverage, which can limit or preempt the government's options.
- Political dialogue with terrorists or hostages.
- Coverage of obviously staged events.
- Becoming part of the incident and participating in negotiations. The media in the role of an arbiter usurps the legal responsibilities of the government.
- Payments to terrorist groups or supporters for interviews or access.
- Coverage of military plans or deployments in response to terrorist incidents.

The solution to these problems is not government-imposed restraint that conflicts with the First Amendment's protection of freedom of speech and the press. The media must serve as their own watchdog. Journalistic guidelines have been developed for use during wartime to protect lives and national security, and in some circumstances should be considered appropriate during a terrorist situation.

The government has a responsibility to maintain effective communications during a terrorist incident. Officials should keep their comments within cleared guidance, avoid sending inadvertent signals, or leading other governments astray. Conflicting statements by different departmental spokespersons give an impression of disarray, which meets one of terrorism's objectives.

Many Americans believe that terrorists use the media to achieve their goals, according to the previously mentioned research study. While they also believe that the media exaggerates and sensationalizes incidents, they firmly support absolute freedom of the press as guaranteed by the First Amendment.

Television coverage received the most criticism, with some coverage perceived as inaccurate, incomplete and not reflective or analytical. According to those interviewed, it has the potential for making heroes out of criminals and exploiting the privacy and grief of affected families. Television also dramatizes the entertainment value of an event. Newspapers were judged as offering more detailed information and news magazines as offering more perspective.

The Task Force found that much of the media coverage concentrates on the families of hostages as human interest stories. Their public statements understandably reflect the perspectives of distraught individuals principally concerned with the safe return of their relatives. Some of these statements may unintentionally play into the hands of terrorists, who reinforce the families' concerns by claiming the lives of the hostages are in danger. Family members sometimes turn to the media to bring pressure on the Administration to take action that may not be appropriate or possible.

While both the American public and the Administration have debated the role of the media in terrorist incidents, the media has questioned its own policies. The coverage of the TWA Flight 847 hijacking in June 1985, where 104 Americans were taken hostage and one was murdered, stimulated a professional review within the media to reexamine the balance between the desired goal of keeping the people informed and the vital issue of public security. Individual media organizations have discussed professional reporting guidelines, and ethical standards have been adopted by some members of the press, including television networks. However, there is no industry consensus on either the need for or the substance of such guidelines.

# Task Force Conclusions and Recommendations

Terrorists of the '80s have machine-gunned their way through airports, bombed U.S. Embassies and military facilities, pirated airplanes and ships, and tortured and murdered hostages as if "performing" on a global theater screen. These international criminals have seized not only innocent victims but also the attention of viewers who sit helplessly before televisions around the world.

International terrorism is clearly a growing problem and priority, requiring expanded cooperation with other countries to combat it. Emphasis must be placed on increased intelligence gathering, processing and sharing, improved physical security arrangements, more effective civil aviation and maritime security, and the ratification and enforcement of treaties.

It is equally essential, however, that our defense against terrorism be enhanced domestically. For unless the trend of terrorism around the world is broken, there is great potential for increased attacks in our own backyard.

The Task Force's review of the current national program to combat terrorism found our interagency system and the Lead Agency concept for dealing with incidents to be soundly conceived. However, the system can be substantially enhanced through improved coordination and increased emphasis in such areas as intelligence gathering, communications procedures, law enforcement efforts, response option plans, and personal and physical security.

Terrorism is a bipartisan issue and one that members of Congress have jointly and judiciously addressed in recent years. Significant bills have been passed that markedly expand U.S. jurisdiction over terrorists and close prosecution loopholes.

However, there are stronger legislative proposals that are now before Congress that would further strengthen the nation's ability to combat terrorism both at home and abroad. Many of these proposals merit strong Administration support. It is also essential that the Executive Branch agencies continue to work closely with Congress in reviewing our current programs and recommending other legislative initiatives as appropriate.

Terrorism deeply troubles the American people. They feel angry, victimized, vulnerable and helpless. At the same time, they clearly want the United States Government to have a strong and consistent national antiterrorist policy. While such a policy exists, the Task Force believes that better communication is necessary to educate the public to our policy and to the ramifications of using force during a terrorist attack.

Americans also believe that terrorists take advantage of our free press to achieve their goals. News coverage of terrorism has created a dilemma for media executives: how to keep the people informed without compromising public security. Solving this problem will have to be a joint effort between media and government representatives. The government must improve its communications with the media during a terrorist attack. At the same time, the media must maintain high standards of reporting to ensure that the lives of innocent victims and national security are not jeopardized.

In December 1985, the Task Force on Combatting Terrorism completed its comprehensive examination of terrorism both internationally and domestically. It also finished its review of our nation's policy and programs for combatting terrorism.

The resultant findings emphasized the importance and appropriateness of a no-concessions position when dealing with terrorists. Some of the recommendations must remain classified, but the following unclassified Task Force recommendations are in keeping with that national policy and are intended to strengthen and streamline our current response system.

## **NATIONAL POLICY AND PROGRAM RECOMMENDATIONS**

### **National Programming Document**

Currently a number of agencies and departments within the Executive Branch are responsible for the elements of our national program to combat terrorism. While this is a reasonable and appropriate approach, the various elements should be compiled in a single programming document. Such a comprehensive listing would allow quick identification of agencies responsible for dealing with particular aspects of terrorism and their available resources.

The Task Force believes that such a document is necessary for the most effective coordination of the department and agency activities that comprise our national program. The NSC staff, in conjunction with OMB and the Departments of State and Justice, would maintain this national programming document.

### **Policy Criteria for Response to Terrorists**

Because acts of terrorism vary so much in time, location, jurisdiction and motivation, consistent response is virtually impossible. However, the Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism should prepare, and submit to the NSC for approval, policy criteria for deciding when, if and how to use force to preempt, react and retaliate. This framework will offer decisionmaking bodies a workable set of standards by which to judge each terrorist threat or incident. The use of this framework also would reassure the American people that government response is formulated consistently.

Criteria for developing response options might include the following:

- Potential for injury to innocent victims
- Adequacy and reliability of intelligence
- Status of forces for preemption, reaction or retaliation
- Ability to identify the target
- Host country and international cooperation or opposition
- Risk and probability of success analysis

- U.S. public attitude and media reaction
- Conformance with national policy and objectives

### **Establish New National Security Council Position**

A full-time NSC position with support staff is necessary to strengthen coordination of our national program. Working closely with the designated Lead Agencies, the position will be responsible for:

- participating in all interagency groups
- maintaining the national programming document
- assisting in coordinating research and development
- facilitating development of response options
- overseeing implementation of the Task Force recommendations

### **Speak with One Voice**

Clear communications by appointed spokespersons and coordination of public statements during a terrorist incident are vital. Interagency working groups should provide specific guidance to all spokespersons on coordinating public statements. Without coordination, inaccurate information may result, intelligence resources may be compromised and political distress can result among friends and allies throughout the world—at a time when international cooperation can save lives.

Designation of spokespersons and response guidelines are especially important given the intense media pressure for comment during terrorist incidents. A misstatement or failure to consider legal issues before commenting to news media could jeopardize a criminal investigation or an eventual prosecution.

### **Review American Personnel Requirements in High-Threat Areas**

Actions already have been taken to strengthen security of U.S. installations and to reduce personnel in dangerous areas. However, to date these efforts have not been fully coordinated among all agencies. The Department of State should direct Ambassadors in all designated high-threat areas to thoroughly review personnel requirements to determine if further personnel reductions are possible at U.S. facilities overseas. This review should include careful consideration of physical vulnerability of embassy-related facilities. The Department of Defense also should conduct a similar review for military commands abroad.

## **INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION RECOMMENDATIONS**

### **Pursue Additional International Agreements**

International cooperation is crucial to long-term deterrence of terrorism. It can be achieved through multilateral and bilateral agreements. While progress in achieving a multilateral

agreement has been slow, efforts should continue to reach an agreement to show that many nations are committed to fighting terrorism as an international crime against society.

In the absence of a multilateral agreement, the Department of State should aggressively continue to seek international cooperation through:

- general resolutions or agreements, in the United Nations and in other specialized organizations, concerning civil aviation, maritime affairs and tourism
- enhanced and more widely-ratified international conventions on subjects such as hijacking, hostage-taking and protection of diplomats
- less formal agreements that illustrate an international consensus to take effective action against terrorism
- improved implementation of existing agreements to fight terrorism

### **Close Extradition Loopholes**

The United States itself is sometimes used as a safehaven for terrorists. Present extradition treaties with other countries preclude the turning over of fugitives wanted for "political offenses," an obvious loophole for terrorists. The State Department should seek extradition treaty revisions with countries with democratic and fair judicial systems to ensure that terrorists are extradited to the country with legal jurisdiction.

The process of closing these loopholes has begun with the United Kingdom in the form of proposed revisions to the US/UK Supplementary Treaty. The State Department should vigorously pursue Senate approval of this treaty and continue the revision process with other countries to ensure that terrorists are brought to justice.

### **Impose Sanctions Against Vienna Convention Violators**

It is a fact that certain governments actively support terrorism. These states sometimes use their diplomatic missions as safehavens for terrorists or as caches for their materiel—a direct violation of the Vienna Convention. The State Department should continue working with other governments to prevent and expose violations of the Vienna Convention. A U.N. General Assembly resolution condemning the protection of terrorists in diplomatic missions could complement U.S. efforts to counter this abuse.

### **Evaluate and Strengthen Airport and Port Security**

Pre-flight screening of passengers and carry-on baggage is a cornerstone of our domestic security program. Since 1972 these procedures have detected over 30,000 firearms and resulted in 13,000 arrests. However, the recent terrorist acts against international aviation and maritime interests indicate a need for continual monitoring and updated security procedures. This is especially true at ports and on board ships where there are no international or federally prescribed security measures.

The interagency Working Group on Maritime Security, chaired by the Department of Transportation, should survey security procedures and the threat potential to vessels, passengers and crew members. It also should review statutory authority. If adequate authority does not exist, recommendations should be made, in consultation with other ap-

appropriate agencies, for new legislation. In addition, legislation should be pursued to allow for a criminal background investigation of individuals working in restricted areas at airports and terminals. Finally, the Department of State and the Coast Guard should continue to work through the International Maritime Organization to develop internationally agreed measures to protect ships' passengers and crews.

## **INTELLIGENCE RECOMMENDATIONS**

### **Establish a Consolidated Intelligence Center on Terrorism**

Intelligence gathering, analysis and dissemination play a pivotal role in combatting terrorism. Currently, while several federal departments and agencies process intelligence within their own facilities, there is no consolidated center that collects and analyzes all-source information from those agencies participating in antiterrorist activities. The addition of such a central facility would improve our capability to understand and anticipate future terrorist threats, support national crisis management and provide a common database readily accessible to individual agencies. Potentially, this center could be the focus for developing a cadre of interagency intelligence analysts specializing in the subject of terrorism.

### **Increased Collection of Human Intelligence**

U.S. intelligence gathered by technical means is adequate and pursued appropriately. At the same time, there is clear need for certain information that can only be gained by individuals. An increase in human intelligence gathering is essential to penetrate terrorist groups and their support systems.

### **Exchange of Intelligence between Governments**

The national intelligence effort relies heavily on collection and liaison arrangements that exist with many friendly governments. Such exchanges with like-minded nations and international law enforcement organizations have been highly useful and should be expanded to support our own intelligence efforts.

## **LEGISLATIVE RECOMMENDATIONS**

### **Make Murder of U.S. Citizens Outside the Country a Federal Crime**

Currently, it is not a crime under U.S. law to murder an American citizen outside our borders—with the exception of diplomats and some government officials. Legal protection of diplomats should be extended to include all U.S. nationals who are victims of international terrorism. The Departments of State and Justice should continue urging Congress to adopt legislation, such as the Terrorist Prosecution Act of 1985, that would accomplish this objective.

### **Establish the Death Penalty for Hostage Murders**

While there is legislation that allows the imposition of the death penalty if a death results from the seizure of an aircraft, there is no specific legislation that would allow for the same penalty for murder of hostages in other situations. The Justice Department should pursue legislation making anyone found guilty of murdering a hostage under any circumstances subject to the death penalty.

## **Form a Joint Committee on Intelligence**

Procedures that the Executive Branch must follow to keep the Select Intelligence Committees informed of intelligence activities need streamlining. Adoption of a Joint Resolution introduced last year by Congressman Hyde would create a Joint Committee on Intelligence. This Resolution would reduce the number of people with access to sensitive information and provide a single secure repository for classified material. The Department of Justice should lead an Administration effort to secure passage of the Hyde proposal.

## **Establish Additional Incentives for Terrorist Information**

The 1984 Act to Combat International Terrorism authorizes payment of up to \$500,000 for information in cases of domestic and international terrorism. Many feel this legislation does not go far enough.

The State Department should lead an interdepartmental push with Justice and CIA for legislation to develop a unilateral and/or bilateral program to encourage individuals to provide information about terrorists' identity or location. In addition to monetary rewards, other incentives include immunity from prosecution for previous offenses and U.S. citizenship for the individual and immediate family.

Authorized rewards should be publicized to both foreign and American audiences and consideration should be given to raising the current \$500,000 ceiling to \$1 million.

## **Prohibit Mercenary Training Camps**

The International Trafficking in Arms Regulations have been strengthened to require a license to train foreign persons in the use of certain firearms; however, mercenary/survival training camps still operate domestically within the law. Appropriate agencies should closely monitor the extent to which foreign nationals are being trained in the United States in the use of firearms and explosives and seek additional legislation if necessary.

## **Stop Terrorist Abuse of the Freedom of Information Act**

Members of terrorist groups may have used the Freedom of Information Act to identify FBI informants, frustrate FBI investigations and tie up government resources in responding to requests. This would be a clear abuse of the Act that should be investigated by the Department of Justice and, if confirmed, addressed through legislation to close the loophole.

## **Study the Relationship between Terrorism and the Domestic and International Legal System**

International and domestic legal systems are adequate to deal with conventional war and crime. However, on occasion, questions of jurisdiction and authority arise when it comes to terrorism. For example, there are ambiguities concerning the circumstances under which military force is appropriate in dealing with terrorism. This lack of clarity about the international law enforcement relationships and legal systems could limit governments' power to act quickly and forcefully. The Departments of State and Justice should encourage private and academic study to determine how international law might be used to hasten—rather than hamper—efforts to respond to an act of terrorism.



## **Determine if Certain Private Sector Activities Are Illegal**

In some cases individuals and companies have paid ransoms to terrorists for the return of kidnapped employees or stolen property. Such action is in direct conflict with the national policy against making concessions or paying ransoms to terrorists. The Department of Justice should consider whether legislation could be enacted and enforced to make such payments to terrorist organizations illegal.

## **COMMUNICATIONS RECOMMENDATIONS**

### **Expand our Current Support Program for Hostage Families**

Due to the intense pressure of a hostage situation, some family members of hostages have pressured the highest levels of government for information. While this is understandable, such activity has the potential to delay return of hostages by giving terrorists the media attention they seek or the belief that their demands are being considered. Further, the inadvertent disclosure of sensitive information could jeopardize efforts to gain the release of hostages.

The family liaison program, conducted by State's Bureau of Consular Affairs, should provide a broader outreach program to include visits, hot-lines, information on private counseling services and a personal contact for each family for communication even when there is nothing new to report. Such an expanded contact program will help the families understand that the hostages' interests are being given the highest priority by our government.

### **Launch a Public Education Effort**

Because of the lack of understanding and currently available information concerning our national program for combatting terrorism, a broad education effort should be undertaken to inform the American public about our policy and proposals as well as the many ramifications of the use of force against terrorism, including death of innocent people, destruction of property, alienation of allies and possible terrorist reprisals. The education effort would take the form of publications, such as this report, seminars and speaking opportunities by government officials.

### **Working with the Media**

Terrorists deliberately manufacture sensations to capture maximum media attention—a ploy that often takes advantage of U.S. press freedom. This activity can be offset by close communication between media and government. The U.S. Government should provide the media with timely information during a terrorist crisis. The media, in turn, should ensure that their reporting meets the highest professional and ethical standards.

Regular meetings between media and government officials on the coverage of terrorism could contribute to more effective government-media relations.

# Appendix II

## RESPONSIBILITIES OF PRINCIPAL DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES

Numerous federal departments and agencies contribute to the national program to combat terrorism. The following provides a detailed listing of the various activities of those agencies with major responsibilities.

The Department of State carries out programs for combatting terrorism in the following ways:

- Discharges its Lead Agency responsibilities for terrorism outside the United States
- Maintains the security of U.S. overseas diplomatic and consular facilities
- Cooperates with U.S. businesses as part of its effort to enhance the security of private U.S. citizens abroad
- Conducts research and analysis on terrorism
- Provides security for visiting foreign diplomats and dignitaries
- Protects the Secretary of State
- Provides training for personnel of U.S. overseas missions on security and crisis management
- Provides antiterrorism training and assistance to civilian security forces of friendly governments.

The principal offices involved in these functions are the Office of the Ambassador-at-Large for Counter-Terrorism; the newly created Bureau of Diplomatic Security; the Bureau of Intelligence and Research; the Office of Foreign Building Operations; the Foreign Service Institute; and the Office of Foreign Missions.

### Department of Justice

The Department of Justice pursues the following counterterrorism-related activities and programs through the FBI, the Justice Department's Criminal Division and the Immigration and Naturalization Service:

- Carries out its Lead Agency function to prevent, respond to, and investigate violent criminal activities of international and domestic terrorist groups within U.S. jurisdiction
- Investigates terrorist acts abroad under the new Hostage-Taking Statute that makes the hostage-taking of U.S. citizens overseas a federal crime
- Collects and investigates intelligence on terrorists to predict potential movement or criminal activities

- Investigates terrorist incidents and related criminal activities using investigative techniques to identify, arrest, prosecute, and incarcerate those responsible
- Maintains operational liaison with local law enforcement agencies throughout the United States
- Provides training in the field and at the FBI Academy, Quantico, Virginia
- Participates with local and state authorities in joint terrorism task forces
- Provides computer-assisted research and analytical capability to other law enforcement and intelligence community agencies involved with counterterrorism
- Maintains contact with and conducts limited joint investigations with allied national police and security services on terrorism through 13 legal attache offices
- Collects technical information regarding terrorist explosives and bombings within the United States and disseminates it to international bomb data centers
- Heads the national Hostage Rescue Team, a special group of highly trained FBI agents who deal with critical terrorist situations.
- Provides legal direction and support during terrorism investigations
- Supervises and coordinates subsequent prosecution of members of domestic and international terrorist groups whose acts violate federal criminal law
- Inspects and determines eligibility for applicants to enter the United States
- Maintains national and local lookout systems containing data relating to excludable aliens, including suspect or known terrorists.

## **Department of Transportation**

The Department of Transportation's Federal Aviation Administration, U.S. Coast Guard and the Office of the Secretary conduct antiterrorism programs by carrying out the following:

- Conducts Lead Agency responsibilities through the Federal Aviation Administration by promoting the security of civil aviation, including prevention of air piracy, sabotage and criminal activities within the jurisdiction of the United States
- Provides assistance to law enforcement agencies in interdicting movements into the United States of dangerous drugs and narcotics that may be connected with terrorist activities
- Maintains operational, investigative, communications, and liaison arrangements, with many foreign governments and private organizations such as aircraft manufacturers and airline pilots' associations

- Devotes substantial resources to airport and aircraft security programs both inside the United States and abroad
- Assures the safety and security of vessels, ports, and waterways, and their related shore facilities
- Offers transportation safety courses at domestic facilities in support of the Department of State's Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program
- Advises on transportation security matters; provides security programs to protect personnel, communications equipment, and facilities

## **Department of Defense**

Defense Department agencies involved in combatting terrorism include the National Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Individual armed services antiterrorist programs supplement the overall Defense Department effort. After the Iranian hostage rescue attempt, the Department of Defense established a counterterrorist organization with permanent staff and specialized forces. These forces, which report to the National Command Authorities through the Joint Chiefs of Staff, provide a range of response options designed to counter specific acts of terrorism.

Additionally, the Defense Department maintains worldwide technical collection systems for gathering round-the-clock information on terrorism, which it disseminates to other federal agencies. It also contributes intelligence analysis and operational support to the national counterterrorism effort, maintains data on terrorist groups and produces publications on incidents and advisory and warning messages.

## **Central Intelligence Agency**

The Central Intelligence Agency and other elements of the intelligence community contribute vitally important intelligence to the NSC and the Lead Agencies before, during and after terrorist incidents. This organization is particularly crucial in the flow of information between the United States and other countries.

Analytical units of the CIA prepare both current and long-term reports on terrorist organizations, individuals and trends, and disseminate these reports on a timely basis to all government agencies with counterterrorist responsibilities. Should the White House direct military action in a counterterrorist situation, the CIA is prepared to provide intelligence support to the Defense Department.

The Director of Central Intelligence has overall coordinating responsibility within the intelligence community for counterterrorism. He has designated the National Intelligence Officer for Counterterrorism as the focal point to coordinate national counterterrorism intelligence activities and to ensure counterterrorism priorities are established for the intelligence community.